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Societal debates about the riskiness and acceptability of controversial technologies
have led scientists to propose and apply quantitative definitions of risk. In parallel
to this, psychological research has focused on identifying the factors underlying risk
judgments and risky decisions. One such factor is the (subjective) probability of a
future loss or accident. The present monogaph reports on a series of studies
about the cognitive mecha"isms underlying accident probability assessment.
For complex and realistic risky activities, accident probability judgments may be
based on two fundamentally different types of information: frequency and scenario
information. Frequency information refers to the outcomes of similar situations or
activities in the past ("how often did accidents happen?"). Scenario information
describes the way(s) in which a future accident may occur ("how might an accident
happen?"). The aim of the present research was to study the role and relative
importance of these types of information for risk judgment and risky decision
making. Two main hypotheses were tested. The first is that, in general, people are
sensitive to both frequency and scenario information; the second is that the relative
importance attached to these types of risk information may vary, dependent on the
nature and the quality of the information itself, the fype of risky activity under
consideration, and individual factors. In Chapter L these topics are introduced and
the remainder of the book is outlined.
Psyvhological reseuth on risk judgment (Chapter 2)
In a review of psychological studies on risk judgment and risky decision making,
four research traditions are distinguished. In the experimental tradition well-
defined lotteries have been used to study subjects' risk judgments and/or risky
decisions. Using lotteries allows investigators to precisely manipulate and control
relevant variables, e.g., outcome values and probabilities. This line of research has
yielded a variefy of - increasingly complex - risk measures, formulated in terms of
elementary lottery components, outcome distribution characteristics, or axiomatic-
ally derived generic models. The external validity, however, of conclusions based
on lottery studies is disputed.
Investigators in the psychometric tradition have asked subjects to rate or rank
brief descriptions of realistic risky activities with regard to several evaluation
criteria. Multidimensional scaling techniques were used to identify the cognitive
dimensions underlying riskiness and acceptability judgpxents. 'Riskiness' was found
to increase when potential losses are more serious and when the activity at hand is
perceived as being less voluntary, less controllable, and less familiar. Risk accept-
ance appears to depend also on the benefits that may be gained. Due to the cor-
relational nature of this type of study, the interpretation of results in terms of
underlying causal mechanisms poses serious difficulties.
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In the personalistic tradition interindividual differences in risk-taking tendency
have been studied. Demographic variables (..g., age, gender), personality traits
(r.g., achievement motivation, locus of control), and variables which aÍe both
person- and activity-specific (".9., experience, expertise) have all been shown to be
related to people's risk-taking tendency. However, the transsituational generality of
the obtained results tends to be low.
Social-psychological studies have focused on the effects of group processes on
risky decisions. It was found that group discussions tend to magnify the initial
inclinations of group members: there could be risky or cautious shifts of opinion.
The precise mechanisms underlyrng this phenomenon are not well understood.
Studies in which the relative importance of the different factors or dimensions
underlying perceived risk was compared indicate that 'probabilify of a loss or
accident' is one of the more important constituents of perceived risk. However, the
relative importance of this factor was found to depend on the specific value of the
factor itself and on those of other relevant variables. This implies that general
conclusions about the relative importance of the factors underlying perceived risk
are not possible.
Prubsbility theoies qnd hums, pobahílíty utsessrnenÍ (Chapter 3)
Mathematical probability theory is a strictly formal theory; it specifies conditions
that probability statements have to satisfy, but it does not specify how probabilities
are related to real-world events. There are three dominant positions in a philo-
sophical debate on the interpretation or meaning of probability statements. In the
'frequentistic' school of thought, the probabiliry of an event is defined as the limit
of the relative frequency of this event in an infinite sequence of similar obser-
vations. According to the 'subjective' interpretation, probabilities constitute a way
in which people may express uncertainty; a singular probability statement expresses
a personal opinion, the validity of which cannot be determined. In the 'logical'
school of thought, probabilities are comprehended as an extension of formal logic,
describing a "degree of implication" between sets of formal propositions.
Whether people actually adhere to the rules prescribed by normative probability
theory was one of the key questions in earlier psychological studies on human
probability assessment. People appear to obey the normative rules in many in-
stances, but under some circumstances large and systematic violations (or 'biases')
occur. Later and more descriptive studies revealed that people solve probability
assessment tasks by applying a limiled number of relatively simple rules (so-called
'heuristics'). So fat, this has yielded satisfactory answers to the question why
people violate normative probability rules. However, as yet this approach has not
resulted in a general descriptive theory of human probability judgment. What is
lacking is a theoretical framework enabling one to predict which heuristic will be
















































































FrcErcncy information srd scenuio informdion (Chapter 4)
Based on a review of the relevant literature, three general strategies for probability
assessment are distinguished. Accident probability judgments may be based on: (a)
relative frequency information, which is information about the outcomes of similar
situations in the past; (b) cogniliys scenario information, which is information
about the way(s) in which a future accident may occur; and (c) logical deduction
from knowledge about the outcome-generating process, given that the latter is
relatively simple and completely understood. Since this is usually not the case for
realistic risky activities, accident probabiliry judgments concerning such activities
will generally be frequency-based and/or scenario-based.
Frequency-based probability judgment requires two steps. First, the past
frequency of the target event (e.g., an accident) has to be assessed. Information
about past event frequencies may originate from several sources, e.g., personal
experiences, accounts of specific incidents by others, or externally supplied
statistical risk information. Subsequently, a simple rule is used to convert the
available frequency information into a probability assessment: an event's probability
of occurrence is judged to be higher if its past (relative) frequency of occurrence is
higher. The relevance of frequency information for assessing future accident
probabilities should depend on the normative quality of the available information.
Three different quality aspects are indicated: credibility, statistical reliability, and
substantive validity.
Scenario-based probability judgment also involves two stages. First, available
knowledge about the activity in question is used to mentally construct relevant
scenarios, i.e., coherent sequences of events resulting in the occurrence of the
target event. The cognilivs availability (ot 'ease of mental construction') of
accident scenarios then serves as a cue for the [kelihood of future accidents: the
accident probability is judged to be higher if it is more easy to imagine more
different accident scenarios. The quality or plausibility of the available scenarios
should also play a role. It is hypothesized that available scenarios will affect
probability judgments more strongly when they Íue more internally consistent,
complete, parsimonious, and concrete.
The relative importance of different types of available risk information may not
only depend on the nature and the quality of the information itself. It may also
depend on activity-speciÍic and individual factors. Two such factors aÍe indicated:
the degree to which the activity at hand is perceived as personally controllable and
the extent to which people have prior personal experience with the activity. It is
hlpothesized that scenario information will be more relevant if the risky activity at
hand is personally controllable, whereas frequency information will be more in-
fluential if the activity is uncontrollable. Prior personal experience with a particular
risky activity is expected to generally decrease people's sensitivity to (any lype o0
available risk information.
The above ideas are summarued in a theoretical model (Figure a.1). The model
presents the factors and processes involved in accident probability judgment and
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risky decision making in a structured way. Specific hypotheses, to be tested in the
empirical part of the study, are outlined. These refer to, successively: (a) the
relation between accident probability assessments, risk judgments, and risk-taking
decisions, (b) the nature and relative importance of frequency-based and scenario-
based probability judgment, ild (c) the role of 'personal control' and 'personal
experience' in risk judgment and risky decision making.
Fryeimenrs (Chapters 5 through 8)
ln qeriment I effects of frequency and scenario information variations on risk
judgments and risky decisions concerning small-scale, personally controllable risky
activities (".g., car driving, mountain climbing) were studied. One hundred and
fwenty eight subjects read L6 descriptions of realistic decision problems, offering a
choice between a risky and a safe alternative. Short paragraphs containing risk
information could be inserted into each description. The inserted risk information
was varied across subjects (either no information, only frequency information, only
scenario information, or both). Within subjects, frequency information varied with
regard to the height of the reported accident frequency and three different quality
aspects: source credibility, statistical reliability, substantive validity; scenario
information varied with regard to the number of suggested accident scenarios, their
concreteness, and their controllability. For each risky activity subjects assessed the
probability of an accident and indicated whether they would decide for or against
the risky option.
Subjects appeared to base their accident probability judgments and, to a lesser
degtee, their risky decisions on both Upes of risk information, but scenario infor-
mation was found to dominate frequency information; the added presence of
scenario information clearly suppressed the effect of available frequency infor-
mation. With regard to frequency-based risk judgment, it was found that reporting
a higher past accident frequency resulted in higher accident probability judgments.
The quality of the available frequency information, on the other hand, appeared to
have been ignored by our subjects. With regard to scenario information, it was
found that accident probability judgments were higher if more accident scenarios
were made available and if the presented scenarios were more concrete. The
degree of personal control implied by the suggested accident scenarios also in-
fluenced accident probability judgments; suggesting more personal control yielded
lower risk judgments. Data from a post-experimental questionnaire revealed that
greater 'personal control' and 'personal e4perience' go along with lower risk
judgments and more risk-taking decisions.
In qeriment 2 a similar setup was used as in experiment L. Ninety-six subjects
read brief descriptions of risky choice problems into which short paragraphs of risk
information were inserted. The main difference with experiment 1 was that all
stimuli now referred to large-scale, personally uncontrollable risky activities (".g.,













































information, now consisting of both frequency and scenario information, was varied
with regard to: (a) the reported past accident frequency, (b) the quality of the
frequency information, (c) the number of suggested accident scenarios, and (d)
their concreteness. In addition, the suggested degree of personal control over the
proposed risky activities was varied.
Several results from experiment 1- were replicated. Subjects gave higher risk
judgments and decided less often in favor of the risky option when the reported
past accident frequency was higher and when more accident scenarios were made
available. Frequency information quality was again ignored by the subjects, whereas
varying scenario quality did affect their responses. Subjects who had had personal
experience with a particular risk again gave lower risk judgments and chose the
risky option more often. Analysis of the combined data of experiments L and 2
revealed that frequency information plays a more prominent role when the risk at
hand concerns a large-scale activity than when it concerns a small-scale one.
Varying the suggested degree of personal control over the risky activities failed to
affect the subjects' responses; this may have been due to difficulties in the opera-
tionalization chosen. Individual differences in 'locus of control' were found to be
related to differences in risk judgments and people's sensitivity to risk information.
ln qerimenÍ 3 actual risk-taking behavior rather than imagnary situations and
decisions were studied. One hundred and twenty eight subjects performed a com-
puterized laboratory task. In each of 60 trials, subjects had to stop a fast moving
symbol before it passed a target line. Success yielded a small gain; failure led them
into a 'penalty task' in which they could incur a considerable loss. On each trial
subjects chose among L0 risk levels (uarytog symbol speeds), low levels resulting in
small but alrnost sure gains, whereas high levels yielded larger but less probable
gains. Three penalty task characteristics were varied across groups of subjects: (a)
the actual probability of loss Q.67 versus 0.33), (b) the external ('chance') or
internal ('skill') determinstion of outcomes, ild (c) the available risk information,
which consisted of different combinations of frequency information and/or process
information. The latter provided subjects with sufficient insight in the outcome-
determining process to logically deduce the relevant probabilities.
Subjects took less risk (i.e., they failed fewer main task trials) when the actual
loss probability in the penalty task was higher. Internal versus external deter-
mination of outcomes also signiÍicantly affected the subjects' risk-taking behavior;
when the task appeared to be personally controllable, subjects took greater risk
than when the task was not controllable, even though the actual loss probability
was identical in both conditions. Subjects based their risk-taking behavior on the
available process information, but they ignored the presented frequency inÍor-
mation; neither the presence nor the content of frequency information affected the
subjects' main task behavior. Interestingly, all experimental effects on the subjects'
risk-taking tendency appeared to have been mediated through their effort alloca-
tion during task performance, rather than through the subjects' a priori (or 'risk-
setting') decisions.
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F,ryeiment 4 was a field experiment. The effects of simultaneous variations in
uuàilubl" risk information, degree of personal control, and a*ount of personal
experience on risk taking during car driving were studied. Thirry-nvo novice
drivers and 32 experienced drivers made a test drive along a rural road with many
blind curves. Prioi to the drive, all subjects had read a Z-page brochure which did
or did not contain risk information about blind curves. The latter was systematical-
1y varied across subgroups of subjects (either no risk information, only frequency
information, only scenario information, or both). Degree of task control was also
varied: each subject made the same trip twice, onco as the driver and once as a
front-seat pu.."ng"r. Passengers continuously indicated their 'preferred' speed
choice. Both actual (driver) and preferred (passenger) speeds were registered at
20 curve locations.
Main findings were: presenting subjects with frequency and/or scenario infor-
mation resulted in substantial curve speed reductions (about 6 km/h). The risk
information effects were highly robust, i.e., they were similar in alt 'personal
control' and 'driving experience' subconditions. Degree of personal control over
the task had a significant main effect on the subjects' speed choices, but the effect
size was relatively small: actual (driver) speeds were less than 1 km/h higher than
preferred (passenger) speeds. Amount of driving experience was positively related
to risk taking, but - surprisingly - only for female drivers.
Discttssion std concttrsions (Chapter 9)
With one exception (viz. frequency information quality) all factors contained in our
earlier model (Eigurr 4.1-) were found to be related to people's tendency to take
risk. However, since some of the relations among these factors were found to differ
from prior expectations, a revised theoretical model is presented (Figure 9.1).
Subsequently, main fïndings and conclusions with regard to each of the model
components are discussed.
not u wide variety of risky activities and tasks it was found that the subjective
probability of a signiÍicant unwanted consequence constitutes an important -
tnough not the only - constituent of risk judgments and risk-taking behavior.
ór findings also demonstrate that people do not use some standardized mental
algorithm for (accident) probability assessment. Instead, probability judgments
result from several fundamentally different cognitive strategies that are applied in
a flexible manner. Frequency information, scenario information, ild, in some
cases, process information may all serve as the basis for probabiliry judgment.
Our expectations concerning frequency-based probability judgment were only
partially supported; as expected, subjects gave higher accident probability
judgments when the reported past accident frequency was higher. But contrary to
Lxpictations, the normative quality of available frequency information did not
uppr- to play a signiÍicant role. People appear to utilize statistical risk
infàrmatioo io a less 'critical' way than normative frequentistic probabilify theory



















































































Our expectations about the factors underlying scenario-based probability judg-
ment were borne out. Subjects gave higher accident probability judgments when
the availability of accident scenarios was higher and when the presented scenarios
were qualitativeiy better. Scenario information also seems to serve as a cue for
assessing the controllability of the activity at hand. It is argued that, as yet, insight
into the mental processes involved in scenario construction and in the criteria upon
which scenario quality evaluations are based is rudimentary. Promising paradigms
for further research are indicated.
The present findings do not allow a general conclusion about the relative im-
portance of frequency and scenario information for different types of activity and
situation. Scenario information variations were found to have systematic and fairly
robust effects on the subjects' responses. In contrast, frequency information effects
were less stable and in some cases even inconsistent. People's sensitivity to
statistical risk information seems to depend on a variety of factors, for instance, the
informational conditions, the type of risk at hand, and individual characteristics
(..g., personalify differences in 'locus of control'). However, the precise relation-
ships between these factors and people's sensitivity to statistical risk information
have not become clear.
Having prior personal experience with a particular risky activiry was found to
generally result in lower risk judgments and a greater tendency to take risk. This
may be related to the fact that for the fype of risks stud.ied accidents are relatively
scarce events and earlier experience is predominantly positive in nature.
Perceiving (more) personal control over a risky activity was found to generally
lower risk judgments and to increase people's risk-taking tendency. The most
plausible explanation for this effect is that people - usually correctly - assume that
personal control may be used to steer an activity away from undesirable outcomes,
thus lowering the probability of such outcomes. Contrary to expectations, personal
control does not appear to be a crucial variable underlying the differences in
people's sensitivity to frequency and scenario information.
Differences in personal control appear to affect the nature of risky decision
making itself. The riskiness of uncontrollable activities depends on decisions which
are made prior to the activity's undertaking (so-called 'risk-setting' decisions); the
outcomes of controllable activities, on the other hand, also depend on one's
behavior when actually performing the task. For such tasks, people may react to
increasing risk by changing their 'risk-setting' decisions, but also by improving their
task performance, o.8., through effoÉ allocation. The results of experiment 3
indicate that - at least in some instances - people prefer the second option.
Implications of this notioD are discussed. For instance, the above response pattern
may reflect a general tendency to overestimate the degree to which activities are
personally controllable and/or the extent to which the available (behavioral)
resources are adequate. Such biases may result in excessive risk taking and, thus,
contribute to accident occurrence. Secondly, in the case of personally uncontrol-
lable activities risk may be expressed in terms of static probabilities; here, risky
decision making largely amounts to gambling. In contrast, risk judgments concern-
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ing controllable activities are necessarily conditional upon both the expected task
demands and the expected personal capabilities, in terms of, e.g., skills, knowledge,
and effort. For such tasks, a more dynamic ("stress-like") conceptualization of risk
may be more appropriate: 'risk' reflects the extent to which the (expected) task
demands exceed the available personal resources. Thirdly, it is argued that our
own ideaS, e.g., about the informational determin2lts and the stress-like nature of
perceived risk, may be fruitftrlly combined with the risky-choice theory proposed by
Lopes (1987) and with 'closed loop' driver behavior models to yield an adequate
framework for analyztng decision making about and behavior in personally control-
lable risky activities.
In the epilogue it is argued that the present research differs in several respects
from earlier studies on risk judgment and risky decision making. Methodologically,
we have combined elements of the 'experimental' and the 'psychometric' research
traditions (see Chapter 2). Theoretically, it has become apparent that risk judg-
ment and risky decision making involve ild, in fact, result from - sometimes
extensive - cognitive information processing. Therefore, research into this area
should be more cognitive-psychological in nature than it used to be.
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